101 Falmouth Road, Hodge Hill, Birmingham B34 6EJ
Lady Justice Smith said Parliament had given various forms of statutory protection
to people who contracted to work for others.
The entitlement of an individual to the various forms of statutory protection depended on the legal status of the individual. Essentially, there were three possibilities: self employed; a “limb (b)” worker; or an employee. A worker who was not an employee was a limb (b) worker. If he was a worker, the next question was whether he was an employee. The fact that the parties to a contract described the effect of their contractual arrangements in a particular way was not conclusive of the actual effect of the arrangements. Where contractual terms were in writing, they would usually be taken as representing the agreement between the parties, but, if one party to the agreement claimed that the written terms did not represent the true agreement, the court would have to decide what the true agreement was. In the present case, there were contractual documents. Autoclenz contended that the terms set out in the documents properly reflected the nature of the contractual relationship. The valeters contended that they did not.
The question for the Court of Appeal was whether the employment judge had been entitled
to infer from evidence that the written contract did not genuinely reflect the rights
and obligations of the valeters. In her Ladyship’s judgment, the employment judge
had been so entitled. Her Ladyship was conscious that the employment judge observed
more than once that the valeters knew when they were taken on that Autoclenz regarded
them as self-
Autoclenz sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. In March the Supreme Court granted permission and a hearing should follow this year.